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Venture Capital, Private Firms, 
and the Capital Acquisition Process
Rick H. Mull
This paper presents an empirical examination o f the incentives motivating 
venture capitalists and sample o f growth option intensive private firms with acute 
capital requirements to interact, the gains each group achieves through this 
association, the types o f private firms successftilly attracting venture capital, and 
mechanisms used in this funding process. Results show that venture capital 
backed firms achieve growth rates (1) greater than expected, and (2) greater than 
a matched sample o f non-venture capital backed firms. This paper also finds that 
low collateral asset values, low profitability, and younger firm age to be significant 
determinants in which firms obtain venture capital funding. Finally, this paper 
shows that the use o f the convertible preferred stock to be positively related to 
increasing firm risk, and that venture capital backed firms use convertible pre­
ferred stock more frequendy than do non-venture capital backed firms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent venture capital research provides insight into the certification role of 
venture capitalists, their contract structures, risk/return characteristics, and 
investment decision processes^ Yet no empirical analysis currendy exists 
examining how venture capitalists benefit by providing funds to private firms, 
nor the mechanisms they use in providing fiinds to private firms^. Addition­
ally, there is limited empirical literature focusing on private firms with acute 
capital requirements, the specific mechanisms used by such firms in overcom­
ing barriers to capital formation, and how these firms benefit by the use of 
venture capital. This paper integrates these ideas, examining the incentives 
motivating venture capitalists and private firms to interact, the gains each 
group achieves through this association, the types of private firms successfully 
attracting venture capital, and mechanisms used in this fiinding process.
Rick H. Mull • College of Business Administration, Fort Lewis College, Durango, CO 81301.
The Journal of Small Business Finance, 3(3) :229-248 Copyright © 1994 by JAI Press, Inc.
ISSN: 1057-2287 All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
To explore this process, a matched sample of venture capital backed and 
non-venture capital backed private firms in high growth potential industries 
is identified. These private firms are confronted by the limited capital re­
sources of private equity markets, as well as the informational (Myers & 
M^luf, 1984), incentive (Jensen 8c Meckling, 1976), and reputational (Dia­
mond, 1984) difficulties associated with capital formation. Funding difficul­
ties are further intensified by low historical profitability and an urgent need 
to finance high levels of non-collateralizable assets. As Whited (1992) shows, 
financial constraints significantly limit investment spending for even rela­
tively large, publicly-traded firms. Capital limitations will surely be even more 
binding for small, private firms that need to finance very rapid growth.
This paper examines three basic predictions regarding the use of venture 
capital by private firms.
1. Venture capital involvement contributes to firm informational asym­
metry reductions and provides reputational capital to certify firm 
value to outsiders (Barry, Muscarella, Peavey III, & Vetsuypens, 1990), 
and Megginson and Wiess (1991). Such benefits should stimulate 
capital access and allow venture capital (VC) backed firms to achieve 
greater growth than similar non-venture capital (non-VC) backed 
firms.
2. The high marginal capital costs associated with venture capital fiind- 
ing (Gartner, 1988, Morris, 1987,&Sahlman, 1988) suggests that firms 
with fewer alternative capital sources, higher capital requirements, 
lower collateral asset values, and expected returns potentially high 
enough to cover these costs may successfully obtain venture capital 
funding.
3. This paper predicts that venture capitalists are particularly adept at 
using convertible preferred stock, a specialized financial vehicle, as a 
mechanism to align management incentives, reduce investment risk, 
and provide valuable options on firms assets.
These predictions are examined using a matched sample of venture and 
non-VC backed firms. Initial comparisons find VC backed firms to have lower 
sustainable growth rates (a priori) than the matched set of non-VC backed 
firms. In spite of this, results show VC backed firms’ actual growth rates to be 
far greater than the a priori expectations implied by sustainable growth rates. 
Further, VC backed firms realize greater positive spreads between sustainable 
(expected) and actual (subsequent) growth than non-VC backed firms. Here, 
evidence shows that both venture capitalists and the firms they back benefit 
by the gains reaped through higher growth. Regzirding VC backed firm-specific
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characteristics, results show that firms with lower collateral asset values, lower 
profitability, and younger age are associated with the use of venture capital. 
Finally, convertible preferred stock is found to be a significant funding 
mechanism associated with venture capital backing, and that its use is posi­
tively related to increasing firm risk as proxied by earnings per share, collat­
eral asset value, and firm age.
n. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
To examine the testable hypotheses, a matched sample of VC backed and 
non-VC backed private gro^^-option intensive firms is identified. Initially, 
390 VC backed initial public offerings issued from January 1983 through 
September 1987 are identified from the Venture Capital Journal To be in­
cluded, VC backed firms must be in the IDD database and must also have a 
prospectus available from Bechtel Information Service. In order to generate 
as comparable a matched set of VC and non-VC backed firms as possible, each 
VC backed company is matched with a non-VC backed firm having the same 
three digit SIC classification. When there is more than one candidate, the 
non-VC backed company whose offering size is closest to that of the VC 
backed firm is selected. The final sample consists of 320 VC backed and 320 
non-VC backed companies.^ Financial data is gathered fi-om information pro­
vided to the Securities and Exchange Commission by each firm in the prospecms 
(S-1 or S-18) of its initial public offering (IPO) registration statement.
One possible limitation of the sample is the possibility that these ex-post 
successful firms are not representative of private firms in general, imparting 
a selection and survivorship bias. Countering this is the point that this study 
focuses on the benefits of venture capital backing, not on determining the 
breadth of venture capital success. The focus on the benefits of venture capital 
backing necessitates the study of successful firms. Prospectuses are used since 
they represent the only available comprehensive source of financial informa­
tion about private firms. Further, the sample is relatively large (320 firms) 
and taken from a matched strata of successful VC and non-VC backed IPO 
firms in the same industry. This should reasonably control for selection bias 
given this paper’s focus.
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m. PRIVATE FIRMS AND CAPITAL ACQUISITION
Private firms typically face numerous barriers to optimal capital formation. 
Confined to the limited resources of the non-public capital markets they are
unable to capture the benefits of public market monitoring. The sample firms 
in this study sufifer additional firm-specific traits fiirther limiting capital 
acquisition. Tables 1 and 2 summarize these characteristics and illustrate the 
unique nature of the firms identified in this study.
The sample SIC code distributions presented in Table 1 illustrate the high 
growth potential, high-technology industry concentrations of the sample 
firms. Fully 31.1 percent of all firms are in computer and electronics related 
businesses.^ Table 2 surveys sample financial characteristics and highlights 
the sample firms’ need for external capital to finance subsequent growth. 
First, low internal funds availability is suggested by low profitability and cash 
flow measures. Median earnings per share (profitability) for the VC backed 
sample is -0.045 and for the non-VC backed sample is $0.05. Median gross 
cash flow to long term debt (cash flow) is 0.069 for VC backed firms and 0.455 
for non-VC backed firms. Yet these same firms achieve subsequent median
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Table 1
Differences in Population Proportions Using Populations Proportions Tests Between 320 
Venture Capital Backed (VCB) IPO’s with Offer Amounts of $3 Million or Greater and Prices 
of at Least $5 Per Share and the Total Remaining Universe of 2324 Non-venture Capital 
Backed (NVCB) IPO’s in Industries with Venture Capital Investment Activity from Januaiy 
1983 throu^ September 1987 Grouped by Four Digit SIC Code.
Proportion (percents) for Individual SIC 
Code Categories
SIC Code Classification VCB NVCB Z*
283 Drugs/Biologics/Pharmaceutical 3.9 1.1 3.93®
307 Plastics/Rubber Products 1.8 0.6 2.33*’
357 Computer Equipment 22.1 0.4 21.01“
366 Communication Equipment 2.1 0.5 3.22*
367 Semiconductors/Electronic Components 7.1 1.3 6.91“
384 Surgical/Medical/Dental Instruments 4.7 1.6 3.72“
506 Electronic Parts 1.5 0.2 3.08“
737 Prepackaged Software 9.7 4.1 4.46“
739 Biotech and Pharmaceutical Engineering 7.7 1.4 7.44“
Totals 60.6 14.8 19.01“
Notes: Results are reported only for SIC codes with statistically significant results and venture capital 
investment greater than 1.5 percent.
*Z is the Z score for differences in two population proportions.
^Different from zero at the one percent level of significance.
^Different from zero at the five percent level of significance.
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Table 2
Selected Descriptive Statistics for the Industiy-matched Set of Venture Capital Backed (VCB) 
and Non-venture Capital Backed (NVCB) Firms Going Public Between January 1983 and 
September 1987.
Variable Fir Type
Number of
Observations Mean Value
Median
Value
Standard
Deviation
Total asset compound annual VCB 272 122.4% 53.4% 2.37%
growth rate (% per year) NVCB 270 211.1% 33.2% 12.87%
Earnings per share VCB 278 -0.307 -0.045 1.04
NVCB 279 0.034 0.050 2.35
Earnings per share variance VCB 268 0.741 0.061 3.47
NVCB 259 0.745 0.025 9.45
Inventory and gross plant & VCB 156 1.311 0.478 10.38
equipment /  total assets NVCB 167 0.542 0.518 0.31
Gross cash flow / VCB 112 -6.473 0.069 105.32
long term debt NVCB 127 1.605 0.455 5.378
R&D Expenditures / VCB 309 0.110 0.064 0.257
total assets NVCB 286 0.135 0.011 0.484
Non-collateralizable expenses /  VCB 288 0.174 0.093 0.225
total assets NVCB 287 0.192 0.042 0.552
Total debt /  total assets VCB 226 0.281 0.189 0.309
(first financial statement) NVCB 245 0.318 0.415 0.742
Total debt /  total assets VCB 329 0.611 0.601 0.385
(last financial statement) NVCB 328 0.755 0.663 0.665
Firm age (in years) VCB 317 8.58 5.28 13.35
NVCB 295 12.24 8.01 14.31
Notes: Information was obtained from the firm’s prospectus (S-1 or S-18) of its initial public offering 
(IPO) registration statement.
^Total asset growth is calculated as the compound annual growth rate of total assets from the 
first stated to the last year (just prior to the IPO) of financial data. Earnings per share variabil­
ity is also calculated from the first stated to the last available year of financial data. Inventory 
and gross plant and equipment/total assets, gross cash flow/long term debt, R&D expenses/to­
tal assets, and non-collateralizable (RM) expenses plus selling and marketing expenses) to to­
tal assets are calculated using the earliest financial data available. Total debt total assets are 
calculated for both the initial provided financial statement and the last statement prior to the 
IPO. Firms age is calculated as the number of years from the incorporation date to the firm’s 
IPO.
compound annual total asset growth rates of 53.4 percent for VC backed and 
33.2 percent for non-VC backed firms. To achieve such growth in the face of 
low profitability and cash flow (liquidity) suggests a heavy reliance on external 
funding.
The sample firms are also young (even start-up) firms, with median ages 
of 5.28 years for VC backed firms and 8.01 for non-VC backed firms. Their 
age suggests a lack of firm reputation and high informational asymmetries. 
Myers and M ^liif (1984) show how informational asymmetries would prompt 
corporate managers into rationally foregoing positive NPV investment oppor­
tunities if the firm’s internal cash flow is insufficient to fund these projects. 
Also, Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe how such agency and incentive 
problems between insider owners and outside investors would distort invest­
ment decisions and reduce external funding availability.
Further exacerbating capital requirements, the sample firms also exhibit 
the need to fund both research 8c development (R&D) expenses and selling 
& marketing expenses to generate and exploit potential growth options. The 
VC backed sample records a median ratio of 6.4 percent R&D expenses to 
total assets, with the non-VC backed sample recording a 1.1 percent value. 
For non-collateralizable assets (research & development plus selling & mar­
keting expenses) to total assets, the VC backed sample has a median 9.3 
percent while the non-VC backed sample has a median 4.2 percent. Griliches 
(1986) documents a high payoff to firms successfully commercializing such 
projects. Unfortunately, externally funding such growth projects is difficult 
due to both the non-collateralizeable nature of the asset produced by these 
expenses and the inherent difficulty involved with credibly conveying infor­
mation about the value of such projects to outside investors.
A mechanism allowing these firms to overcome binding liquidity and 
non-collateralizable asset constraints would allow these young, cash poor, 
growth-option intensive firms to increase capital infusions and expand be­
yond their ability to generate cash through existing operations. The role of 
the venture capitalist as just such a mechanism is now examined.
Financial Intermediation and Venture Capital
The points outiined above suggest an economically valuable role for a 
financial intermediary able to reduce informational asymmetries by gather­
ing relevant inside information about a project’s potential, and simultane­
ously capable of directiy funding promising growth options. By directly 
funding successful growth options, financial intermediaries would benefit
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through higher portfolio returns, while firms would benefit through in­
creased investment and firm growth.
Chan (1983) provides a formal model of the venture capitalist as a 
financial intermediary.^ Venture capitalists appear to posses the charac­
teristics of intermediaries as outlined in the classic models of Pyle (1971), 
Benston and Smith (1977), Campbell and Kracaw (1980) and Diamond 
(1984). Venture capitalists issue claims against themselves, using those funds 
to purchase other financial assets. They also lower financial transaction costs 
and capture the benefits of informational intermediation through their role 
as direct investors. Venture capitalists combine the functions of an interme­
diary to external capital sources, a direct investor able to exploit revealed 
profit opportunities, and a corporate insider/director able to effectively 
monitor and discipline management. This unique combination of roles 
allows the venture capitalist to develop specialized market niches as described 
in Fama and Jensen (1985).
This paper predicts that the ability to directiy fund growth options, 
become corporate insiders reducing informational asymmetries, and provide 
reputational capital certifying firm value to outsiders (Barry, et al., 1990; and 
Megginson Be Weiss (1991)), will reduce capital formation barriers and result 
in more optimal levels (higher) of firm investment.® This is tested in Table 3 
by examining VC backed and non-VC backed firm differences in sustainable 
(a priori or expected) and actual total asset growth rates.
Expected growth rates are measured using the “sustainable growth rate” 
(SGR) methodology in Higgens (1977). Sustainable growth rates are calcu­
lated as a function of a firm’s profitability and cash flow from operations, its 
collateralizable asset base, and its borrowing capacity. It is measured as the 
achievable growth rate assuming a constant debt ratio, payout ratio and ROE. 
Note that an analysis of other sample characteristics shows that almost all 
sample firms pay no dividends (Maquieira & Megginson, 1993) document a 
similar point). Thus, asset growth differences subsequent to SGR time period 
calculations maybe attributed to access to either external debt and / or equity 
capital resources.
Initially, a comparison of sustainable growth rates examines the relative 
future growth expectations of the two samples. Table 3, Panel A reports the 
VC backed sample to have lower sustainable growth rates than the non-VC 
backed sample. For every year prior to the IPO, the difference between the 
VC backed and non-VC backed firms’ (VCB-NVCB) sustainable growth is 
negative and significant. This suggests that, a priori, VC backed firms are 
expected to have lower actual growth rates than non-VC backed firms. 
However, Table 3, Panel B examines subsequent actual growth rates and 
reports significant and positive differences for the VC backed subset. VC
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Sustainable Growth rates (SGR) in Panel A and Actual Growth Rates 
(AGR) in Panel B for a Matched Set of 320 Venture Capital Backed and 320 Non-Venture 
Capital Backed Firms.
Pand A - Stistainable Growth Bates (SGRf
Rrm Classification SGRT-3 (N) SGRT-2 (N) SGRT-i (N) SGRTq(N)
Venture Capital Backed -.149*’ (170) -.061^(228) .043'(280) .122^(306) 
Non-Venture Capital Backed .239“ (159) .222^(209) .345=^(252) .230^(287) 
Difference (VCB-NVCB) -.272^(76) -.036^138) -.358^(203) -.102^(247)
Panel B - Actual Growth Rates (AGRf
Firm Classification AGR T-s (N) AGR T-2  (N) AGR T-i (N)
Venture Capital Backed .550^(194) .481^(236) .364^(272)
Non-Venture Capital Backed .395^(168) .394^(214) .257^(270)
Difference (VCB-NVCB) .082*^(90) -.031 (149) .122*’ (207)
Panel C - Difference between Actual and Sustainable Growth (DASG = AGR — SGR)
Firm Classification DASGT-s(N) DASG T-2  (N) DASGT-i(N)
Venture Capital Backed .536^(154) .538^(195) .272“ (240)
Non-Venture Capital Backed .077** (139) .059*’ (180) -.092*’ (224)
Difference (VCB-NVCB) .249*» ( 65) .315“ (106) .482“ (159)
Notes: Panel C contains matched pair non-parametric tests for differences between the actual and 
sustainable growth rates (AGR-SGR) across the different sets of firms. The period for which 
variables are calculated include a time identifier (T.3  indicates the variable was calculated at three 
years prior to the IPO). Actual growth rates are calculated as the growth in total assets for the 
period indicated (AGR T-3 indicates a growth rate calculated from year -3 to year -2 prior to the 
IPO).
^Different from zero at the one percent level of significance.
^Different from zero at the five percent level of significance.
^Different from zero at the ten percent level of significance.
^^Sustainable growth rate is calculated as:
SGR =
P\S/A)H1 +D/e)*R  
l-p*(S /A )*(l+ D /E )*R
where p  = profit margin, S/A = sales/total assets, D/E = debt/equity ratio, and R = retention 
ratio.
backed firms have achieved higher growth rates in total assets than their 
non-VC backed counterparts. Further, Panel C shows significant and positive 
differences between sustainable and actual growth rates (SGR-AGR) for the 
VC backed firms relative to the non-VC backed firms (VCB-NVCB). Here, not 
only are the actual growth rates shown in Panel B higher for VC backed firms, 
but the spreads between actual and sustainable growth rates are also greater 
for the VC backed firms.
These results suggest that firms benefit from venture capital backing by 
attaining growth rates greater than non-VC backed firms, and they achieve 
this in spite of the VC backed firm’s lower sustainable (expected) growth 
rates. Such results would also explain why firms endure payoff striictures that 
protect the venture capitalist and are also willing to concede to the potential 
loss of firm control if pre-specified demanding performance standards are 
not achieved.’
Firm characteristics
As illustrated above, firms experience important benefits associated with 
venture capital backing. In spite of this, few firms (less than 2%) successfully 
attract venture capital backing (see Gartner (1988, p. 35A-8). Thus, the next 
focus is to examine which firms are more likely to attract venture capital.
Amit, Golsten, and Muller (1990) present a model predicting several 
characteristics of firms likely to successfully attract venture capital.
1. With a pool of good projects and either risk averse entrepreneur’s or 
a non-trivial need for new fiinds, they show that some entrepreneurs 
will always seek venture capital financing.
2. If only a portion of the entrepreneurs seek venture capital, it will be 
the less profitable firms.
3. They demonstrate how it may also be worthwhile for some entrepre­
neurs to expend resources to reduce informational asymmetries in 
conveying their ability to venture capitalists.
Three models are developed and tested in Table 4 by combining the 
predications developed in Amit et al. and the predictions of this paper. Model 
1 incorporates the first two predictions of Amit et al. It models the likelihood 
of venture capital backing (VCB) as (1) a positive function of capital needs 
and (2) a negative function of firm profitability. To proxy for a firm’s need 
for fimds, gross cash flow to long term debt, sustainable growth rates, and 
inventory plus gross plant and equipment to total assets are used. Less gross 
cash flow (net income plus depreciation) to long term debt suggests a greater
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need for funds, since these young firms must at a minimum meet debt service 
to stay solvent. Lower sustainable growth rates imply higher funding needs, 
holding firm decisions on the debt ratio, payout ratio, and return on equity 
constant. Finally, lower inventory plus gross plant and equipment ratios imply 
lower asset collateral value, suggesting a higher need for alternative capital 
sources. Profitability is proxied with earnings per share, since lower profit­
ability would suggest greater external funding needs. Model 1 is summarized 
as follows with the expected signs of the variables indicated;
Model 1 : VCB = /(sustainable growth [-], gross cash flow to long 
term debt [-], inventory plus gross plant and equipment [-] , 
earnings per share [-]).
Model 2 adds proxies for informational asymmetries to the model of Amit, 
et al. If venture capitalist are indeed capable of reducing informational 
asymmetries through their active role in firm management, such skills should 
be more valuable to firms with greater informational asymmetries. Firm age 
is used to proxy for informational asymmetry. Younger firms could be ex­
pected to have greater informational asymmetries, since they have developed 
less market reputation and because they are less technologically and opera­
tionally established. While it is true that different industries grow and mature 
at different rates, ceterus paribus, younger firms will face greater risk and 
uncertainty than older firms. Venture capital investment should have a 
greater impact in these young companies than in more established firms.
Model 2 :  VCB=/(sustainable growth [-], gross cash flow to long 
term debt [-], inventory plus gross plant and equipment [-], earn­
ings per share [-], firm age [-]).
The final variable added to the model incorporates the signalling predic­
tion of Amit, et al. Expending resources to signal project quality outsiders 
would allow firm owners to more credibly convey the value of their project to 
outside investors. The presence of convertible preferred stock is used to proxy 
for owner signalling. This option granted by owners to venture capitalists 
allows entrepreneurs to offer the venture capitalist not only a financial claim 
superior to their own, but also an instrument that could be used to limit an 
entrepreneur’s freedom of action and even replace the entrepreneur if 
corporate objectives are not met. Convertible preferred stock also gives the 
venture capitalist an equity claim on that portion of the gains achieved 
through increased investment and asset g rov^ . Model 3 is summarized as:
Model 3: VCB=/(sustainable growth [-], gross cash flow to long 
term debt [-], inventory plus gross plant and equipment [-J, earn­
ings per share [-], firm age [-], convertible preferred stock [+]).
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Table 4
Logistic Regression Results for Tests of Models Predicting Firms Seeking Venture Capital 
Backing on the Basis of Specific Firm Characteristics.
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Variabk^ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept -0.26 -2.26*^ -0.36
Earning per share 0.91 0.37“ 0.25
Sustainable growth rate ^.14" -0.12' -0.10
Inventory and gross plant &
equipment /  total assets 0.19 0.33 0.13
Gross cash flow /  long term debt -0.32*’ -0.29** -0.34‘»
Firm age in years -0.64*’ -0.41*’
Use of convertible preferred stock 2.52“
-2  log likelihood ratio w/intercept only 151.945 151.125 148.129
-2  log likelihood ratio at convergence 32.102 127.237 102.904
Approximate Model .150 .188 .439
Model Chi-Square 19.846“ 23.888“ 45.225“
Number of observations 225 221 219
Notes: The dependent variable is a qualitative variable with 1 = the presence of venture capital backing 
and 0 = no venture capital backing at the firm’s IPO.
^Different from zero at the one percent level of significance.
^Different from zero at the five percent level of significance.
^Different from zero at the ten percent level of significance.
^All variables remain as calculated in Table 2 and 3. The use of convertible preferred stock is 
identified with a (1,0) dummy variable, based on the use of convertible preferred stock at any 
point during the reported operating history of the firm. Sustainable growth is calculated using 
the earliest available financial data for the firm.
Table 4 presents estimations for the three models. Regression results for 
Model 1 finds significant negative relationships between the dependent 
variable of VC backing and the independent variables of sustainable growth 
rate and gross cash flow to long term debt. This suggests that firms with lower 
sustainable growth rates and weaker cash flows are more likely to attract 
venture capital, confirming the first of the Amit, et al. model predictions.
The regression estimation for Model 2 adds the informational asymmetry 
proxy of age. Recall that younger firms are argued to have less reputation and 
greater informational asymmetries, and are thus more likely to obtain VC 
backing. Model 2 estimation finds firm age negatively related to VC backing. 
This suggests that firms may benefit from the part played by the venture 
capitalist in reducing informational asymmetries. As before, VC backing is
negatively related to gross cash flow levels. However, VC backing is found 
positively related to the profitability proxy of earnings per share. This is not 
consistent with Amit, et al’s prediction and suggests instead that venture 
capitalists finance profitable firms that have weak cash flows and that are 
unable to internally finance rapid growth.
The final regression estimation, Model 3, adds convertible preferred stock 
as a proxy for signalling. Results show the use of convertible preferred stock 
positively related to VC backing. As Amit et al. (1990) theorize, some entre­
preneurs are willing to expend resources to provide signals of firm value to 
venture capitalists.
Private firms may be signalling their expectation that the project will be 
successful enough to overcome the high cost of granting the venture capitalist 
the valuable conversion options and potentially restrictive control mecha­
nisms associated vwth convertible preferred stock. Conversely, adding con­
vertible preferred stock as an independent (presumably exogenous) variable 
may cause a specification problem in the model, since use of this security may 
be serving as a proxy for VC backing itself This could happen if venture 
capitalists choose to use this security for various, endogenous reasons other 
than simply as a signalling tool. The issue of convertible preferred stock 
choice is examined in the next section.
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Determinants of Convertible Preferred Stock Usage
Since securities are selected to efficiendy align incentives, reduce risk, and 
provide returns, Table 4 (Model 3) results lead to questions regarding specific 
conditions under which convertible preferred stock is preferred by firms and 
investors. We now examine (1) the factors motivating the use of convertible 
preferred stock, and (2) who is more likely to use convertible preferred stock.
Sample firm traits suggest that optimal funding will occur with equity 
based securities. The technologically sophisticated firms in this study exist to 
exploit lucrative growth options. Myers (1977) shows that such growth-option 
assets are difficult to finance extemally-particulcirly with debt capital. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) likewise describe serious agency costs associated with 
the use of debt financing. Smith and Warner (1979) document significant 
costs associated with enforcing debt contract covenants. Further, the earnings 
variability of these rapidly-growing firms with unproven technologies a i^ e s  
for less debt financing. This is shown by Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) who 
find leverage ratios inversely related to earnings volatility. Also, large research 
& development expenditures are fixed costs increasing operating leverage. 
As Dotan and Ravid (1985) make clear, firms with high levels of operating
leverage should use relatively less financial leverage than otherwise equiva­
lent companies. In an empirical study, Titman and Wessels (1988) docu­
m ent a significant negative relationship between leverage ratios and 
non-collateralizable assets (such as R&D expenditures) in a firm’s asset 
structure. These arguments all suggest that the growth-option-intensive in­
vestment opportunity sets of private firms should be funded as much as 
possible with equity rather than debt capital.
When venture capitalists are involved, convertible preferred stock offers 
several attractive features.® First, while the use of convertible preferred stock 
allows investors to achieve finjincial claims senior to the entrepreneur owner, 
it simultaneously enhances the firm’s borrowing capacity by increasing the 
firm’s equity base. Further, this hybrid security allows the venture capitalist 
to maintain a tight reign over firms by creating a separate security class into 
which positive and negative covenants can be inserted. This controls manage­
ment’s freedom of action in a way that voting rights alone could not achieve. 
It also effectively isolates most business risk on the firm, even while claims on 
superior performance (through the conversion feature) are retained by the 
venture capitalist. Green’s (1984) theoretical analysis of the investment 
incentives that can be achieved with debt and warrants, shows that such 
convertible fixed claim securities may beneficially restructure managerial 
incentives. Such a restructuring of managerial incentives may reduce the 
agency cost of either equity or debt financing (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and 
diminish the incentives of managers to sub-optimally invest (Myers, 1977; 
Myers & M^luf, 1984).
Convertible preferred stock (CPS) may therefore assist firms and investors 
by restructuring incentives. Given such a restructuring, firms could be ex­
pected to attract greater amounts of capital and achieve higher growth (such 
as those in Table 3), Based on this, the use of CPS is expected to be directiy 
related to actual, and inversely related to sustainable growth rates. Venture 
capitalists benefit both by shifting risk to the firm and through greater control 
over firm actions while using the convertability option to increase investment 
leverage and potential returns. Accordingly, if convertible preferred stock is 
indeed a security capable of aligning risk, then its frequency of use should be 
an increasing function of firm risk. The predictions that convertible preferred 
stock use is positively related to actual growth rates, firm risk, and negatively 
related to sustainable growth rates, is tested in Table 5.
Table 5 models the use of convertible preferred stock as a function of four 
proxies of firm risk and as a function of actual and sustainable growth rates.®
1. Earnings per share is used as a measure of firm profitability. Less 
profitability should imply greater firm risk.
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Table 5
Logistic Regression Model Results for Use/Non-use (1,0) of Convertible 
Preferred Stock by Venture Capitalists Based on Key Variables from a 
Sample of 320 Venture Capital Backed Firms. Data for this Sample was 
Gathered from Firm Financial Statements Provided in the Firm’s 
Prospectus (S-1 or S-18) of its Initial Public Offering (IPO) Registration 
Statement
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Explanatory variabl^ Coefficient Chi-Square
Intercept -0.127 0.03
Earnings per share -1.191 8.69^
Firm age in years -0.543 3.19*’
Gross plant and equipment to total assets -0.289 3.34*’
R&D expenses to total assets 0.289 0.21
Asset growth 0.466 2.71‘^
Sustainable growth rates -0.149 4.47“
-2 log likelihood ratio w/intercept only 235.36
-2 log likelihood ratio at convergence 202.84
Approximate Model R^ .16
Model Chi-Square 19.72“
Notes: ^Different from zero at the one percent significance level.
^Different from zero at the five percent significance level.
^Different from zero at the ten percent significance level.
^All variable are calculated as described in Table 2, 3, and 4. Revenue 
growth is calculated as the compound annual growth in revenue from the 
earliest to the latest fmancial data.
2. Firm age is used as a proxy for informational asymmetry and reputa­
tion. Younger firms imply greater informational asymmetries, less firm 
reputation, and greater investment risk.
3. The ratio of gross plant and equipment to total assets is used as a 
mezisure of collateral asset value. Firms with less collateral value should 
have more difficulty in raising capital.
4. R&D expenses to total assets are used to proxy for the lack of collateral 
value.
Higher levels of R&D should suggest greater risk, since these expenses 
are associated with less predictable returns than other investments. Actual 
growth rate is measured by the observed asset growth, while sustainable 
growth rate is the same proxy as used previously.
The model estimation in Table 5 shows earnings per share negative and 
significant at the one percent level, and both firm age and the ratio of gross 
plant and equipment to total assets negative and significant at the five percent 
level. R&D expenses to total assets are not significant. This may occur since 
higher R&D expenses may proxy not only risk, but growth options and 
potential returns as well, offsetting its ability to accurately measure firm risk. 
However, finding the use of convertible preferred stock to be a positive 
function of other firm risk proxies suggests that its use serves to align 
incentives between the firm and outside investors.
The obvious question that follows is, why is it not more commonly used? 
As noted earlier, the incentive alignment benefits of convertible preferred 
stock may be not only a function of firm attributes, but of investor charac­
teristics. To take advantage of the control mechanisms it affords, investors 
must be capable of making informed decisions. Because of their ability to 
directiy invest in firms and actively participate in firm management as corpo­
rate insiders, venture capitalists should be better able to utilize the risk 
alignment features of convertible preferred stock. They do this while simul­
taneously benefiting through the leverage of its convertability feature. The 
prediction that venture capitalists will use convertible preferred stock more 
firequentiy than other investors is tested by examining differences in the 
frequency of convertible preferred stock use by VC backed and non-VC 
backed firms.
Table 6 presents the results for a comparison of the frequency of convert­
ible preferred stock use by both VC backed and non-VC backed firms. Results 
show that 41.92 percent of the VC backed firms and 12.58 percent of the 
matched non-VC backed firms use convertible preferred stock. Sample pro­
portion tests finds this difference significant at the one percent level, showing 
that convertible preferred stock is far more frequently used by VC backed 
firms. This provides evidence that venture capitalists and a specific class of 
firms may reap important benefits through incentive alignment achieved 
through use of this complex financial security.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents an empirical examination of the gains achieved through 
the interaction of venture capitalists and a sample of growth option intensive 
private firms with acute capital requirements.
The symbiotic relationship between venture capitalists and the firms they 
back allow each to capture the benefits of higher growth. Findings show that
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Table 6
Population Proportions and Proportion Test for Significant Differences in the Use of 
Convertible Preferred Stock by Venture Capital Backed and Non-venture Capital Backed 
Firms. The Sample Consists of 320 Venture Capital Backed Firms and a Matched Set of 320 
Non-venture Capital Backed Firms with an Initial Public Offering between January 1983 and 
September 1987.
Sample Size
Proportion with Convertible 
Pr^erred Stock
Venture capital backed firms ni = 320 pi = .4192
Non-venture capital backed firms n2 = 320 p2 = .1258
Combined (total) sample n = 668 p = .2720
Notes: financial statements provided in the firm’s prospectus (S-1 or S-18) of its IPO registrations 
statement were searched for evidence of convertible preferred stock use during the reported 
operating history.
= 8.43 indicates positive differences significant at the one percent level for the venture capital 
backed sample relative to the non-venture capital backed sample proportions.
Sample sizes represent the total number of firms in each category for which financial data has 
been analyzed. The proportions listed represent the proportions of the sample that were found 
to have used convertible preferred stock at any time during the reported operating history 
prior to the firm’s IPO. ^  is based on difference in sample proportion statistics.
VC backed firms achieve greater growth than a matched set of non-VC backed 
firms. They accomphsh this in spite of having lower sustainable growth rates 
than a matched set of non-VC backed firms. Further, VC backed firms 
experience larger positive differences between sustainable (expected) and 
actual growth rates. Characteristics of firms likely to successfully attract 
venture capital are also identified. Evidence shows that firms characterized 
by younger age and higher earnings per share, but lower gross cash flow and 
sustainable growth rates are associated with venture capital backing. Finally, 
this paper shows that the use of convertible preferred stock is associated with 
incentive alignment and risk reduction. Its use is positively related to increas­
ing firm risk and revenue growth, but invereely related to sustainable growth 
rates. Tests results also show convertible preferred stock is used far more 
frequently by venture capital backed firms.
The findings of this paper suggest that venture capitalists act as financial 
intermediaries in funding firms, having developed a special niche of high 
risk, high potential return (but low profitability) firms to fund. They are an 
efficient source for capital to these firms primarily due to their unique 
combination of both financial and informational intermediary roles. This 
combination of roles, along with the use of convertible preferred stock, allows
venture capitalists to reduce informational asymmetries and more closely 
align firm incentives with their own. The achievement of higher growth rates 
for VC backed firms illustrates how venture capitalists successfully demand 
rates of return on their investments far exceeding rates charged by other 
intermediaries.
Firms also benefit from this relationship. Firms allow venture capitalists 
(outsiders) to gamer important inside information about the value of their 
projects. They expend resources (signalling) by alloMring the use of convert­
ible preferred stock as a funding mechanism. Firm owners also allow the 
potential of their removal if objectives are not met. Thus, the entrepre­
neur/ owners of VC backed firms are able to effectively convince outsiders of 
project value, and benefit through faster increases in their asset base than a 
matched sample of non-VC backed firms.
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NOTES
1. For background on the certification role of venture capitalists during a firms Initial 
Public Offering, see Barry, Muscarella, Peavey, and Vetsuypens (1990), and Megginson 
and Weiss (1991). For information of the contract structures employed by venture 
capital limited partnerships, see Sahlman (1988, 1990), Gartner (1988), and Bygrave 
(1988). See Huntsman and Hoban (1980), Martin and Petty (1983), Brophy and Verga 
(1988), and Chiampou and Kallett (1989) for literature detailing the risk and return 
performance of venture capital investments in publicly traded venture capital firms. 
Aspects of various venture capital investment decisions processes are discussed in 
Tyebjee and Bruno (1984), Robertson (1987), and Macmillan, Kulow, and Khoylian 
(1988).
2. Several previously noted studies do theoretically suggest benefits and mechanisms 
related to venture capital backing. However, the author believes this paper to be the 
first in depth empirical analysis, outside of individual case analysis, specifically examin­
ing the benefits and mechanisms associated with venture capital backing using a large 
number of venture capital backed firms.
3. This same sample is the same as used in Megginson and Weiss (1991). The author 
expressly thanks them for generously providing valuable financial data.
4. To construct the matched sample, the universe o f2,644 firm commitment IPOs issued 
from January 1983 through September 1987 is obtained from Investment Dealers’ 
Digest Corporate Database (IDD). After eliminating financial institutions, S&Ls, and 
firms whose first day trading price is unavailable from Standard and Poor*s Daily Stock 
Record: Over-the-Counter, the remaining sample of firms from which matches are identi­
fied consists of 1,845 offers. To formally test whether venture capitalists concentrate 
their investment in particular industries (i.e., high-tech), the industry distribution of 
VC backed IPOs is examined for significant differences from the universe of all 2644
IPOs during the study period. The hypothesis that these two groups are drawn from the 
same population of firms can be rejected at the one percent significance level.
5. There are two other economic roles played by the venture capitalist. First, venture 
capitalists are expected to perform a certification function during initial public offerings 
when they, along with auditors and investment bankers, place their reputational capital 
at risk to certify that the offering price incorporates all relevant private information. 
Second, venture capitalists who retain their ownership stakes in newly-public firms 
perform the management monitoring function typically expected of large-block share­
holders. See Barry et al. (1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991).
6. In an analogous fashion, Koshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1989) examine a set of 
Japanese firms with informational (Myers & Majluf, 1984) and incentive (Jensen and 
Meckling) problems. They find that those firms which are associated with a “Keiretsu” 
(industrial group) are less concerned with liquidity than those which are not, and that 
they are thus able to pursue a more optimal investment strategy.
7. Several authors—including Gartner (1988), Morris (1987) and Sahlman (1988)—have 
documented that venture capitalists expect compound annual returns on the private- 
firm investments they make to range from 25 to over 50 percent, depending upon the 
stage of project development. The payoff structure implied here is the use of convertible 
preferred stock. The specific arguments for this security are presented later.
. 8. The use of convertible preferred stock (CPS) has been previously suggested by Sahlman 
(1988, 1990), Colder (1987), and Testra (1987). However, the author knows of no 
formal test (1) to determine actual frequency of CPS use by venture capitalists in a 
sizeable sample, or (2) to examine characteristic differences in CPS usage between 
venture capital backed and non-venture capital backed firms.
9. Note that it can only be determined if a firm has CPS in its capital structure at the time 
of (or within three years of) its IPO. If the firm had used CPS early in its history, there 
may be no evidence of that fact remaining in the financial statements disclosed with its 
IPO. This measure of CPS usage must therefore be considered a lower bound. Further, 
firms are not consistent in the method for reporting the use of CPS. Since most firms 
eliminate CPS from their capital structure prior to the IPO, disclosure requirements are 
limited. Thus, a m '^ority of firms do not report additional information such as common 
share equivalents, the size of the block held by any one individual, or voting rights.
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